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Abstract—Security plays a vital role in promoting the practi-
cality of Wireless Body Sensor Networks (BSNs), which provides
a promising solution to precise human physiological status moni-
toring. A fundamental security issue in BSN is key management,
including establishment and maintenance of the key system. How-
ever, current BSN key management solutions are either designed
for specific phases of a BSN’s life-time or restricted to strong as-
sumptions such as homogeneous BSN composition, pre-deployed
key materials, and existing secure path, which limits their
applications in real-world BSNs. In this paper, we develop the
Systematic Key Management (SKM) for practical BSNs, where
basic human interactions are conducted for non-predeployed
secure BSN initialization, and authenticated key agreement is
achieved using lightweight non-pairing certificateless public key
cryptography. We construct a BSN prototype consisting of self-
designed motes and Android phones to evaluate the real-world
performance of SKM. Through extensive simulations and test-bed
experiments, we demonstrate that our lightweight SKM scheme
manages to provide high security guarantee while outperforming
state-of-the-art approaches in terms of both computation and
storage efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, Wireless Body Sensor Networks (BSNs)
draw considerable attentions as a viable solution to human
physiological status monitoring [1]. Compared with general
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), human physiological data
generated by BSNs have more rigorous security and privacy
preserving requirements [2]. For instance, the broadcasting
nature of wireless communication leads to the vulnerability of
BSNs: attackers can breach personal privacy of BSN users by
eavesdropping the communication. In addition, false data may
be injected to incur detrimental physiological status judgement
and may lead to a fatal consequence. Therefore, a practical
BSN system must be carefully secured.
For the security and privacy concerns, the wireless commu-
nication of a BSN should be encrypted. A key management
scheme is often used for the establishment and maintenance
of keys in a secure BSN. Existing key management schemes
are often designed for specific phases of a BSN’s life-time
[3]–[10]. These schemes often take unrealistic assumptions, in-
cluding homogeneous BSN composition [6], [7], pre-deployed
key materials [8], [9], and the existence of secure paths [5],
[10], to fight against potential threats. However, for practical
BSNs, multiple types of keys should be subtly organized
to form an interactive system as the foundation of upper
level security schemes. Meanwhile, the tradeoff among system
security, usability, and resource occupation should be carefully
managed. A secure, thorough, and efficient key management
mechanism is critical for the practicality of BSN.
In this paper, we design the Systematic Key Management
(SKM) scheme to manage an interactive key system for
BSNs. Specifically, SKM performs human-interactive non-
predeployed network initialization, elliptic curve based non-
paring certificateless authenticated key agreement for both
wide-area and local BSNs, and key system maintenance during
the entire life-time of BSNs. SKM can prevent major security
threats in BSNs, including impersonating attack, combinatorial
attack, public key replacement attack, and collusion attack.
Meanwhile, it outperforms current BSN key management
approaches in terms of computation and storage costs.
II. SYSTEMATIC KEY MANAGEMENT
The typical architecture of BSNs is shown in Fig.1. Multiple
wearable and implantable wireless sensor nodes are associated
by a personal controller to continuously monitor user’s phys-
iological and environmental status. All controllers regularly
transmit sensed data to the medical data server for profiling
and querying by BSN accessors. In this paper, we treat the
subsystem of the controller and sensor nodes as a local BSN,
and that of the data center, controllers and BSN accessors as
the wide-area BSN.
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Fig. 1: BSN Key System Architecture
To secure data transmissions among BSN entities, multiple
types of keys are implemented. They are mutually related,
forming a key system shown in Fig.1. BSN personal controller-
s and accessors register at the data center for authentication
keys. Then, the controller and sensor nodes perform group,
pairwise and individual key agreements based on their au-
thentication credentials. Communicating entities use existing
secure path to establish temporary session keys. We design
SKM to secure the establishment and maintenance of such a
key system.
In this paper, we assume that all sensor nodes are able
to correctly measure human physiological and environmental
statues, and the BSN operator can be fully trusted. Attackers
are not able to obtain physiological data without physical
contact with the user, or to physically capture sensor nodes
without being noticed.
A. Preliminary
SKM consists of three components: BSN user and accessor
registration (Algorithm 1), local BSN network association and
authenticated key agreement (Algorithms 2-6), and BSN key
system maintenance (Algorithm 7). In SKM, the security of
authenticated key agreement is based on commitment schemes
[11] and the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)
[12].
1) Commitment Schemes: The commitment scheme allows
one to commit to a chosen value, hidden to others, and reveal
it later. Generally, it consists of two steps:
 Commit(m;x)! (c; r);
 Reveal(m; c; r)! x 2 f0; 1gn [ ;,
wherem is public data; x is n-bit private data to be committed;
c is the committing value; and r is the revealing value.
Here, given (c;m), x cannot be calculated without r, which
is called the hiding property. Meanwhile, given (m; c; r), x
must be the only output of the revealing algorithm, which is
called the binding property. They guarantee that private data
cannot be changed after being committed.
In SKM, the non-malleable hash based commitment scheme
in [4] is adopted.
2) Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem(CDHP): CDHP
is treated as a basic intractable math problem in asymmet-
ric key agreements [4], [5], [10]. CDHP on elliptic curves
(ECDHP) is clarified as follows.
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group on elliptic curve Fq , the
generator is P with a prime order of q.
 ECDHP: given P , aP , bP , a; b 2 Zq , the computation
of abP is intractable.
In SKM, we consider ECDHP as intractable.
Notations used in SKM is shown in Table.I.
B. BSN User and Accessor Registration
Before a local BSN is implemented, the controller has to
register at the data center to get authenticated initial keys. It is
reasonable to assume that the medical data center has already
been maintaining pairs of identity and authentication code
(IDoi; CODEoi) for all legal BSN operators. See Algorithm
1.
In SKM, the registration and session key establishment for
data accessors are the same with that of the controller.
TABLE I: Notations
DC : Data center.
CNi : The ith controller.
Npi : BSN sensor number of CNi.
Noden : The nth node.
NIDn : Node identity of Noden.
x : Master private key of CNi.
Ppub : Master public key of CNi.
dn : CN side partial private key of Noden.
Tn : CN side partial public key of Noden.
xn : Node side partial private key of Noden.
Pn : Node side partial public key of Noden.
Knindi : Individual key of Noden.
Knn
0
pair : Pairwise key between Noden and Noden0 .
Gi : Identity of Groupi.
KGi : Group key of Gi.
H : One way hash function.
Hr : Universal hash function with key r.
SymEnc : Symmetric encryption.
SymDec : Symmetric decryption.
< Fq ; E=Eq ; Gq ; P >: Elliptical curve E on finite field Fq .
Algorithm 1 Registration of CNi at the Data Center
Variables:
IDoi: Identity of Operatori;
CODEoi: Secret code of Operatori;
IDpi: Identity of Useri;
NONCE: Message freshness code;
Kpi: Session key between the CNi and the DC.
1: Operatori initializes registration of CNi.
2: CNi notifies DC :< IDoi; IDpi; Npi >.
3: DC checks for CODEoi based on IDoi.
4: DC notifies CNi :
Mi = SymEnc(CODEoi; (Kpi; SymEnc(Kpi; NONCEpi))).
5: Operatori enters CODEoi for authentication.
6: CNi decrypts Mi by SymDec(CODEoi;Mi).
7: CNi notifies DC :< IDoi; SymEnc(Kpi; NONCEpi+1) >.
8: DC checks for NONCEpi+1 based on Kpi :
9: if Match(NONCE) = False then
Registration fails;
10: else
DC stores < IDpi; Npi;Kpi; IDoi > as CNi’s index;
DC notifies CNi : User registration succeed.
11: end if
C. Local BSN Network Association and Authenticated Key
Agreement
After the registration of the controller, the BSN operator
is able to setup local BSNs. Local BSN network association
and authenticated key agreement consists of 4 main steps:
initialization, node identification, node authentication, and
authenticated key agreement.
In the initialization, the operator chooses sensor nodes based
on the scale of local BSN. BSN controller then determines and
publishes system parameters. See Algorithm 2.
After system parameter publication, the controller notifies
nodes in the local group to identify themselves. This process
prepares credentials for physical comparison. See Algorithm
3.
After the node identification, nodes have to be authenticated
by the BSN operator. See Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 2 Local BSN Initialization
1: Operatori picks Npi nodes to form group Gi.
2: CNi determines system parameters:
q : A k-bit prime;
< Fq; E=Eq; Gq; P >: Elliptic curve E on prime finite filed
Fq;
x 2 Zq : Master private key;
Ppub = xP : Master public key;
H : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gk: One-way hash function;
Hr : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gk: Universal hash function with key r;
3: CNi publishes 
 =< Fq; E=Eq; Gq; P; Ppub; H;Hr > as the
system parameter.
Algorithm 3 Local BSN Node Identification
Variables:
rn: Revealing value of Noden;
Rn: Group of received r;
Cn: Committing value of Noden;
NIndn: Index of noden;
Indexn: Group of received indexes.
Functions:
V erify(M): Verify the validity of M on CNi.
1: CNi initializes: Index0; R0  ;;
2: CNi broadcasts: Committing begins.
3: 8Noden 2 Gi:
Choose xn 2 Zq ; rn 2 f0; 1g;
Compute Pn = xnP;Cn = H(NIDnjPnjrn);
Broadcast NIndn =< NIDn; Pn; Cn >.
4: CNi; 8Noden 2 Gi : Indexn  NIndn[f8j 6= n;NIndjg.
5: Till committing terminated:
6: if V erify(jIndex0j = Npi) = False then
abort;
7: else
CNi broadcasts: Revealing begins.
8: end if
9: 8Noden 2 Gi broadcast: < NIDn; rn >.
10: CNi; 8Noden 2 Gi : Rn  rn [ f8j 6= n; rjg.
11: Till revealing terminated:
12: if V erify(jR0j = Npi) \ (8j 6= 0; Cj = H(NIDj jPj jrj)) =
False then
abort;
13: else
Node identification succeed.
14: end if
After the node authentication, an interactive key system is
established by the controller and all authenticated nodes. See
Algorithm 5,6.
D. BSN Key System Maintenance
In BSNs, for newly added network entities, authenticated
keys should be agreed upon; for lately exited entities, related
keys should be revoked. In SKM, the addition of BSN users
can refer to user registration discussed in II-B. For user exits,
getting user’s exit application, the data center can simply
revoke user’s authenticated key pair and notifies the entire
network. On the other hand, member changes in local BSNs
need further discussion.
Algorithm 4 Local BSN Node Authentication
Variables:
SAS: Short authentication string.
Functions:
trunc(M): Truncate the first 20-bits of M ;
PhyCMP (M;G): Physically comparison of M among G.
1: CNi; 8Noden 2 Gi compute:
SASn = trunc(HRn(Indexn)).
2: CNi broadcasts: Node authentication begins.
3: 8Noden 2 Gi perform: LED blinking based on SASn.
4: if PhyCMP (SAS;Gi) = False then
abort;
5: else
Node authentication succeed.
6: end if
Node additions can be divided into single node additions
and patch node additions. Patch node additions can be realized
by treating new nodes as a group and performing the local
BSN network association and authenticated key agreement
protocol. Single node additions are basically similar to patch
node scenarios except for the counting process. The controller
has to announce existing group of the new node and perform
key updates. See Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 5 Local BSN Authenticated Key Agreement
1: CNi extracts partial keys for 8Noden 2 Gi:
Choose tn 2 Zq ;
Compute Tn = tnP; dn = tn + xH(NIDn; Tn; Pn)modq.
2: CNi generates the group key of Gi:
KGi = H(
NpiP
j=1
tjmodq).
3: CNi notifies Noden :Mn = SymEnc(H(xPn); dnjTnjKGi).
4: 8Noden 2 Gi decrypt Mn by SymDec(H(xnPpub);Mn).
5: 8Noden 2 Gi store:
Kpn = (dn; xn);Kbn = (Pn; Tn);K
n
indi = H(xnPpub);KGi .
Algorithm 6 Local BSN Node Pairwise Key Agreement
Functions:
f(x) =
NpiP
i=1
x IDidiP : Pairwise keying material function.
1: CNi broadcasts: Mf = SymEnc(KGi ; f(x)).
2: 8Noden 2 Gi decrypt Mf by SymDec(KGi ;Mf ).
3: 8Noden; Noden0 2 Gi : Knn0pair = H(dnf(IDn0)).
Algorithm 7 Single Node Addition into Existing Groups
1: Nodeadd applies for single node addition to CNi.
2: CNi authenticates Nodeadd using single SAS comparison.
3: CNi performs authenticated key agreement with Nodeadd.
4: CNi updates Npi, KGi and f(x).
5: CNi broadcasts: SymEnc(KGi ; N
1
pijK1Gi jf(x)1).
6: Nodeadd performs pairwise key agreement based on f(x)1.
If a node’s life-time is expired, or the node is compromised,
it has to exit current BSN. The controller needs to broadcast
node revocation notification, which clarifies that all keys
related to the exit node are invalid. Then the group key has to
be updated and distributed using individual keys of remained
nodes.
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section provides theoretical analysis of SKM in terms
of security, usability and completeness.
A. Security
We discuss about commonly considered attacks in different
phases of BSN key management to demonstrate the security
of SKM.
1) BSN User and Accesscor Registration: Registration of
the personal controller is based on human interactions. The
operator’s identity is authenticated using identity and code
based Challenge-Response process, after which registration
index and individual key are established. Such registration can
only be done with an legal BSN operator, mitigating possible
impersonating attacks.
2) Local BSN Network association and Authenticated Key
Agreement: Identification and authentication of local BSN
nodes are based on the commitment scheme. In node iden-
tification, commitments are broadcasted and counted before
the final revealing. Both the number of node and commitment
validity are verified. SKM prevents attackers to access group
authentication credentials by combinatorial means in advance.
Possible combinatorial attacks are mitigated.
Authenticated key agreement is realized based on Certifi-
cateless Public key Cryptography(CL-PKC) [5]. The controller
extracts node’s public and private key parts. Combining self-
generated public and private key parts, nodes are able to
establish controller-authenticated public and private key pairs,
where the node ID is bound with the public key. Possible
public key replacement attacks can be mitigated.
Pairwise keys between legal nodes are established locally
based on authenticated keying materials distributed by the
controller. The establishment of pairwise keys depends on
controller-side private key parts of sensor nodes. Even if
multiple nodes are compromised, no keys of legal nodes will
be disclosed. Possible polynomial based collusion attacks are
mitigated.
3) BSN Key System Maintenance: In SKM, because of the
notice of node exit from the controller, keys related to the
exit node will not jeopardize the key system. Then, SKM
establishes a contributory group key whose composition is
determined by all legal group members. It’s sensitivity of
member changes guarantees forward and backward secrecies
of the key system.
B. Usability
In SKM, reasonable human interactions are used to perform
wide-area and local BSNs initialization, key system establish-
ment and maintenance.
For wide-area controller registration, system adaptability
is only restricted by resource capacity of the data center.
The network association of local BSNs does not depend on
pre-deployed information. Thus network composition can be
flexibly determined considering BSN user’s personal condi-
tions. Necessary cryptography operations are transparent to
the operator, which provides a high usability.
C. Completeness
SKM is responsible for key system establishment and
maintenance during the entire life-time of BSNs. Specifically,
authentication key and individual key of BSN users and ac-
cessors, as well as individual key, pairwise key, authentication
key, and group key of the BSN controller and sensor nodes
are established, forming an organic key system.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, computation, storage and communication
costs of SKM are discussed. Numerical experiments are con-
ducted to evaluate the performance of SKM. We also built a
testbed to verify the correctness and efficiency of SKM.
A. Numerical Evaluation
To the best of our knowledge, few of current approaches
consider the interconnection among keys in BSN systems. Li
et al. [4] designed a relatively systematic network initialization
and key management scheme. We conduct performance com-
parison between SKM and GDP proposed by [4]. In numerical
experiment, local node number is set to be between 5 and 40.
1) Computation Cost: SKM tends to maintain a reasonable
computation cost while guaranteeing its security performance.
The experiment compared computation cost of SKM with that
of [4]. According to [5], the ratio of computation time, under
the same hardware setting, among the exponential operation
E on Zq , the point multiplication operationM on Gq , and the
Hash operation H on Gq was set to be 4:2:1. Compared with
asymmetric operations, computation cost of symmetric opera-
tions was negligible. This was treated as the basic computation
cost unit in the experiment. Meanwhile, the UDB protocol in
[4] was converted to its Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC)
version in the comparison. The experimental result is shown
in Fig.2.
Fig.2a demonstrates the impact of local BSN network scale
on computation time of the controller. Under experiment
settings, SKM has shorter computation time, as (2Npi+1)M+
(3Npi+2)H , than that of [4], as 7M +(Npi+2)H+2NpiE.
The reason is that SKM does not perform distributed con-
tributory group key agreement as [4] does. Meanwhile, in
SKM, the agreement of individual and pairwise keys only need
to perform ECC point multiplication, instead of exponential
operation in [4].
Fig.2b demonstrates the impact of local BSN network
scale on computation time of the sensor node. For direct
observation, the number of node neighbours and the number
of left nodes other than node neighbours are chosen to be
variables. For SKM, computation time of sensor nodes is only
related to the number of node neighbours but the network
scale, while that of [4] is in directive proportion to both of
them. Under experiment settings, computation time of SKM,
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Fig. 2: Computation Costs at the Controller and Node Sides
under Different Network Scales
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Fig. 3: Storage Costs at the Controller and Node Sides under
Different Network Scales
as (Ne + 2)M + (Ne + 3)H , is less than that of [4], as
6M + (Ne + 1)H + (Ne + 1)E. The reason is the same as
that on the controller. ECC point multiplication in distributed
contributory group key agreement and exponential operation in
individual and pairwise key agreement enhance computation
request at the node side in [4].
2) Storage Cost: Considering the restricted resource of
BSNs, SKM manages to reduce storage cost of both the
controller and sensor nodes while guaranteeing the security
performance. The experiment compared storage cost of SKM
with that of [4]. According to [4], for 80-bit key security,
asymmetric key A had to be 160-bit. Meanwhile, we set
symmetric key S to be 128-bit according to the AES algo-
rithm [13]. For direct observation, storage cost ratio between
symmetric keys and asymmetric keys was set to be 3:4. This
was treated as the basic storage cost unit in the experiment.
Meanwhile, UDB in [4] was converted to its ECC version in
the comparison. The experimental result is shown in Fig.3.
Fig.3a demonstrates the impact of local BSN network scale
on storage cost of the controller. Under experiment settings,
storage cost of SKM, as (5Npi+3)S+(2Npi+1)A, is lower
than that of [4], as (3Npi + 3)S + (4Npi + 4)A. SKM does
not use UDB for group key generation, and huge amount of
intermediate asymmetric keying materials are not stored. This
reduces storage request of the controller.
Fig.3b demonstrates the impact of local BSN network scale
on storage cost of the sensor node. For direct observation,
the number of node neighbours and the number of left nodes
other than node neighbours are chosen to be variables. The
result shows that, for both SKM and [4], storage cost of sensor
nodes is in directive proportion to both the number of node
neighbours and the network scale. Under experiment settings,
storage cost of SKM, as (2Npi +Ne + 5)S + (Npi + 3)A, is
lower than that of [4], as (2Npi+Ne+4)S+(4Npi+4)A. In
SKM, unlike that in [4], centralized contributory group key
agreement is conducted only by the controller, and sensor
nodes have no need to store group keying materials that are
not necessary for successive key management. Besides, in
SKM, unlike [4], keys and keying materials for individual and
pairwise key agreement are also maintained by the controller.
These reduce storage request of nodes significantly.
3) Communication Cost: For BSNs, communication cost of
message interactions is critical for system performance. SKM
has to minimize the message number and the message length.
We compared communication cost of SKM with that of [4]. By
analysing experiment settings, message length are basically the
same in two schemes. For direct observation, messages were
divided into three categories: Broadcasting Parameter Message
(BPM), Broadcasting Text Message (BTM), and Unicasting
Encryption Message (UEM). They were treated as the basic
communication cost unit.
Communication costs of both SKM and [4] are basically
the same. For the controller, SKM needs extra two BTM costs,
which could be neglected for their lightweight in broadcasting.
For the sensor node, communication costs are identical, which
leads to no further discussion.
B. Testbed Experiment
In this section, we implemented SKM and evaluated its
feasibility on a self-designed BSN testbed.
Fig. 4: A BSN Prototype for SKM Evaluation
1) Implementation: As we know, commercially available
sensor nodes commonly used by BSN prototypes (like MICAz,
TelosB, and Tmote-Sky nodes) had no specific module (like
the Bluetooth module) to communicate with the smartphone-
based controller. Besides, to the best of our knowledge, there
was still no usable RF module that supported the latest
IEEE 802.15.6 protocol [14]. In the experiment, we indepen-
dently developed a sensor prototype with a HC-06 module
for communications between the controller and sensor nodes
based on Bluetooth 2.0 protocol. On the other hand, mutual
communication among sensor nodes was realized based on
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Fig. 5: Results of Testbed Experiments
IEEE 802.15.4/Zigbee protocol, implemented on a CC2420
RF module.
Our experimental testbed consisted of an Android smart-
phone as the local controller and self-designed motes as sensor
nodes. The controller, MI 2S(Aries), possessed a 1741MHz
QualComm SnapDragon 600 processor, 2GB of RAM, and
32GB of ROM. Each self-designed sensor node possessed
an 8MHz ATmega128L microcontroller, 4KB of RAM, and
128KB of ROM. The network association test is shown in
Fig.4.
For preliminary experiments, we implemented Algorithms
1-7 on our testbed. The ECC parameter was adopted from
secp160r1 in [15], and the length of symmetric keys was set
to be 128-bit according to [13].
The programming of the controller was under Android-
4.4.4. Primitive cryptography operations were provided by
Bouncy Castle Cryptography [16] and Oracle Java Cryptog-
raphy APIs [17]. The programming of sensor nodes was
under TinyOS-2.1.1. Primitive cryptography operations were
provided by TinyECC-2.0 [18] with all optimization switches
enabled. The running-time and storage costs of SKM were
evaluated.
2) Results: Results of testbed experiments are shown in
Fig.5.
Fig.5a demonstrates the relation between running time of
SKM on the controller and local BSN network scale. ROM
cost of the experimental SKM is about 3.61MB, and RAM
cost is no more than 31MB. Storage cost of SKM is practical
on the controller considering its 32GB ROM and 2GB RAM
capacity. Running time of SKM on the controller is no more
than 50s.
Fig.5b demonstrates the relation between running time of
SKM on sensor nodes and neighbour number of the single
node. ROM cost of the experimental SKM is about 23.6KB,
and RAM cost is up to 2.24KB under experiment settings.
Storage cost of SKM is practical on sensor nodes considering
its 128KB ROM and 4KB RAM capacity. Running time of
SKM on sensor nodes is no more than 30.4s.
It is feasible for SKM to accomplish local BSN association
and settle the entire key system in less than two minutes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a lightweight key management
scheme, SKM, to establish and maintain an interactive key
system for practical BSNs. Based on reasonable human in-
teractions, SKM manages to associate both wide-area and
local BSNs with no predeployed information. Different from
traditional schemes, SKM does not need to make any existing
path assumption. Furthermore, by using ECC based non-
paring CL-PKC, SKM manages to guarantee the lightweight
authenticated key agreement. Both analytical and experimental
evaluation indicate that SKM managing the key system in a
secure and efficient way, which demonstrate the great potential
of applying SKM in practical BSNs.
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